hitherto ignored by theorists, addressed the question of inefficiency so paramount in the theory for government regulation. Above all, this case study will show through a real-world example that consumers actually pressurised the state to tax them for lighthouse services despite this possibly benefiting free-riders besides themselves. Our examination of the development of lighthouses in and around colonial Hong Kong along the coast of China is instructive about the questions of technology and institutional arrangements ignored in the debate on Coase's (1974) work, especially because Hong Kong has been well-known as a Tree port'.
Lighthouses: from port markers to maritime highway lights The Western lighthouses along the coast of China were, as elsewhere in the world, first built to mark entrances to trading ports. Good examples were the Guia Light in Macau for Canton (Guangzhou) , and the lights on Tungsha and Woosung for Shanghai.
Subsequently, further lighthouses were built, almost entirely by the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs Service (IMCS), in the intervening distances between ports, due to a shift of foreign trade with Europe from Canton to Hong Kong, which became a British colony in 1842, and the other 'treaty ports' including Shanghai.2 Table 1 shows the history of lighthouse construction along the coast between Shanghai in the north to Macau in the south (during the period 1855-1924) based on the information collected from the authoritative work of Banister (1932) .3 Ships arriving off the Pearl River Delta from Singapore made a point landfall.
This fitted the traditional model of the mark-a-port entrance lighthouse (as described by Coase for pre-nineteenth century English lighthouses) and explained the construction of the Guia Light. The same logic applies to the Taitan, Tiger Island, Square Island, Tungsha, and Woosung Lights. Built during the 1860s, they marked the ports of Amoy, Hangchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, respectively.
From a map, we can see that when Hong Kong joined the international trade 2 The Treaty of Nanjing, which ended the First Anglo-Chinese (or Opium) War, specified five ports which were to be open to foreign shipping, thus doing away with the old 'canton system' based exclusively on a single, controlled access point for foreign shipping into China, a system that had prevailed for some two centuries. The five ports were Canton (Guangzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), Foochow (Fuzhou), Ningpo (Ningbo), and Shanghai. 1. Banister (1932: 46-48, 50, 51, 56, 61 ,66, 71 ,79, 84,89,95, 99, 105, 110, 114, 120, 124, 128, 129, 137, 141, 143, 148, 150, 153, 155, 159, 167, 175, 176, 178, 179, 189, 190, 193, 194) international maritime commerce, the probability is that the number of potentially Tree-riding' vessels was actually extremely small. A very high percentage of international shipping either arriving in southern China from the south and southwest, or leaving China to the south and southwest, would have made their first and last calls in Hong Kong. The reason for this is as a result of the chaos in China in the years of the Taiping Rebellion, the destruction of the port of Whampoa (the port for Canton), and especially its 'mud docks',7 thus leaving Hong Kong, for a crucial few decades, the sole place on the China coast where modern dockyard, coaling and later telegraph facilities could be found.
A larger variant of this problem becomes evident when considering an onward voyage from Hong Kong. Departing Hong Kong for Shanghai, and being economical with the owner's money by plotting the shortest course, the ship would plot its most economical course along the coast outside all hazards (although it would be tempted to pass inside islands here and there), relying on visual fixing to avoid going aground.
For any lights the ship used on the way (and by 1890, as shown in Table 1 , 17 had been built8), it would evidently not be chargeable by the harbour authority within the limits 7 For the story sec Part 1, Chapter 8 of Austin Coates (1980). 8 It is roughly 1 100 miles by sea from Hong Kong to Shanghai, so by the 1890s there was a lighthouse every 50-60 miles along the route. This was sufficient for the navigator of a ship with a bridge 10 m above the sea surface looking at a light 30 m above the sea surface not to have a light in sight for only 1--1.5 hours (about 12 miles) between lights, and, supposing the lights to have been sited intelligently, 1-1.5 hours when the ship was in safe, hazard-free water. In short, by the 1890s, a navigator could reliably navigate from Hong Kong to Shanghai along the coast by the shortest course using lights at night. of whose waters the respective lights may have lain unless it stopped in each and every port. Yet many ships making the coastal passage would not have stopped and would never have been within 10 or 20 miles of the ports proper. On the port dues model, the only lights the ship arriving in Shanghai could be charged for would be those that take the ship into Shanghai itself.
The puzzle of Gap Rock Lighthouse
This narrative of free-riding regarding lighthouses along the China coast, with the possible exception of Gap Rock Light, lends support to the idea that shipping technology (as discussed in the last section of Part I of this article: Lai et al., 2008) converted the lighthouse from a private good that can be easily priced into a Thesis 3 public good. Intuitively, there was a need for a body like the IMCS, headed by Sir Robert Hart, which had an office in every Chinese port. It would, as the IMCS did, build all the lights between ports and pay for them through revenue pooling and sharing from a slice of customs payments. The Samuelson Proposition (Samuelson, 1964) has a good Chinese candidate here. Three critical empirical questions that would verify or refute this proposition are as follows. Regarding Question (a), Table 2 , constructed from facts recorded in Tong (1992) , shows the amount of 'ship money' for all ports in China (based on tonnage) between 1861 and 1910. According to subsidiary agreements under the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, an annual 10 per cent of such dues -changed by Sir Robert Hart to 70 per cent in 1868, thus reflecting the increasing costs of modern lighthouses of the technical quality and number we have commented upon9 -were reserved for the purpose of building, manning, and repairing navigation facilities, including lighthouses. Table 2 thus shows both the amount of 'ship money' and the corresponding funds for navigation infrastructure (including lighthouses and light boats) collected by the custom offices from 1861 to 191010 in the region covered by the lighthouses listed in Table 1 .
Light',13 and 'Green Island Light'.14 At the time, it was estimated that 13 years would be needed to pay back the costs of the lights (Endacott, 1973, 163) . In 1890, an extra 1.5 cents were levied to fund the erection of the Gap Rock Light.
Appendix D to the pre-war yearly series of Reports of the Harbour Master, Hong Kong Government, and post-war Annual Departmental Report, Marine Department for the lighthouses on Gap Rock, Waglan and Green island from 19 10 to, respectively, 1939, 1977 and 1949 show some statistics on the services of the lighthouses in Hong Kong.15 Statistics collected included the number of vessels passed; the number of vessels passed reported (by Morse lamp); the number of times fog signals were fired (hours diaphone fog signals sounded); the number of telegraphic messages sent (received) for the Royal Observatory; and the number of delays in relief (number of days) for lighthouse keepers. These provide evidence for our assertion that the marginal cost (MC) of the lighthouse in serving an extra ship is more than zero, as captured in Figures 3a and 3b in Part I of this article (Lai et al., 2008) . l6 A major observation is that one principal function of the lighthouse was the monitoring of ship movements, which certainly could have served a metering purpose. Details of ships, such as names, length, height, and tonnage, were reported and recorded by lighthouse keepers. Whether this in fact had a revenue intent is, however, a moot point.'7 With the automation of the Tat Hong Lighthouse on Tung Lung Island in 1993,18 all lighthouses in Hong Kong ceased to be manned, but the monitoring function has been taken up by the Vessel Traffic Control System operated by radar and CCTV systems on shore-based locations, monitored by the Vessel Traffic Centre in Shun Tak Centre overlooking Victoria Harbour. (Ha and Waters, 2001, 294) . This withdrawal was probably due to the very harsh conditions on Waglan.
16 Waglan Island had an establishment of nine people, including a principal lighthouse keeper (Ha and Waters, 2001, 295) . This was corroborated by Banham (2005, 71) : 'APV Frosty is ordered to bring the lighthouse keeper and eight of his staff from Waglan Island to Aberdeen' at 10:30 on 13 December 1941 during a general evacuation to Hong Kong Island after the fall of the Shing Mun Redoubt.
17 Lighthouses were staffed and manned as ships. Ships have logbooks in which they record all incidents including the name, numl)er and any particulars of every vessel met at sea. The governing idea in the operation of early lighthouse services was that if ships have logbooks, so should lighthouses. Whilst there was unlikely to have been any revenue-raising intent initially, which was the business of a quite separate part of the maritime bureaucracy, mis is not to deny that the data may subsequently have been used in some kind of auditing function.
18 Ha and Waters (2001, 309 n. 27 ). This happened about six years before the automation of the last manned lighthouse, the North Foreland Lighthouse, in the UK on 26 November 1998. (Ha and Waters, 2001, 287) . The equipment of the lighthouses in and near Hong Kong was based on the latest Trinity House innovations.
In the latter part of the year Matthews Trinity House vaporising oil burner, on the 'Kiston system', was installed at Gap Rock, Waglan Island and Green Island Lighthouses, replacing the Trinity wick burners. It is the latest Trinity House improvement in Lighthouse illumination, thus bringing our three leading lights up to a high state of efficiency, and comparing favourably with any modern light'9
In terms of governance, the Hong Kong model itself was identical to the Trinity House system at the time in England, save for the existence of a government department (the Harbour Department, now Marine Department) in lieu of a charity. This department has collected light dues since 1875.20 There was simply no equivalent medieval charity running lighthouses in Hong Kong. As financing was accomplished by a user-pays system (indirect taxation), not direct taxation or general revenue, this Hong Kong model could be considered Coasian, as it was in line with Coase's (1974) criticism of Samuelson. In addition, the Hong Kong model had a feature that was more satisfactory than the post-1836 Trinity House model in terms of the BarnettBlock Question. The Hong Kong government did not pass any law precluding private lighthouses. Thus, one could speculate that private lights might have been erected in or near Hong Kong.
An inspection of British Admiralty (BA) charts 1459 of 1883 and 1466 of 1910 give some evidence of this. On the 1880 BA1459 there are only two lights in Victoria Harbour, both serving to identify the two most important passenger piers -on Murray Pier on Hong Kong Island, the main military landing place; and on the pier on Kowloon Point, the main landing place for vessels carrying people across the harbour.
Neither seems to have been officially notified to the BA since they do not appear in the List of Lights for 1885. However, in 1910 on BA1466 there are 11 such lights, all marking the end of private commercial piers and labelled as such. Whilst it may thus be true that major navigational lights were in fact built and managed by public authorities, where lower-cost private lights were needed, there was no impediment to Tamsui Harbour on Taiwan (Formosa), just before the island's annexation by Japan following China's defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War.
After it was completed, funding for Gap Rock Light triggered a political debate between local business interests and the government. Acting contrary to the petition of local shipping interests, the Governor of Hong Kong, William Robinson, refused to take off the extra light dues of 1.5 cents, invoking the idea that lighthouse charges did not make Hong Kong less a Tree port', as there were still 'no customs duties'. Robinson's argument was unreasonable, as the name 'light dues' did not alter the reality that it was an indirect tax on shipping -although neither directly nor exclusively on goods since ships in ballast paid light dues, as did ships carrying cargo or passengers, in relation to their net tonnage. In defending his position, Robinson employed an interesting argument used by the overwhelming majority of the appointed advisory Legislative Councillors that light dues could be regarded as harbour dues.21 6. In this connection with one exception, all the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council, to whom I referred the matter, do not concur (with the petitioner's prayer), being of the opinion that shipping should not be entirely exempt from taxation as petitioners desire, and they maintain that if the present 2 V2 cents a ton are continued not as light dues but harbour dues there will be no infringement of the freedom of a port -a free port being one at which no customs duties are levied, and there is no intention to charge customs dues at Hong Kong.22 (authors' italics) While the government's meaning of 'free port' would probably not have satisfied Barnett II and Block, as compulsory payments are levied, the re-interpretation of light dues as harbour dues fits the idea that the user charges metered in terms of the net tonnage of a ship could be regarded as a charge towards maintaining the general port infrastructure. *3 Cerin's (2006) idea of a tie-in-sale bundling together the use of lighthouses and other port facilities (but not bundling use of lighthouses with ship cargo) seems to have historical roots.
Note that the firm position of the colonial government in breaking an implied promise to lower light dues after the construction of Gap Rock Light eventually paid off, which suggested that the marginal cost of running lighthouses was positive and the volume of trade had expanded, thereby fitting our falling MC model with price Governor Robinson also provided evidence that there was no need for the lighthouses in Hong Kong territory and on Gap Rock to rely on cross-subsidies from other taxpayers:
4. So far as light dues are concerned I agree with the petitioners that the revenue derived from them should be applied to the purpose for which it was raised, viz., the upkeep and maintenance of the lighthouses; and it is true that the charge of one cent a ton is sufficient to cover all present expenditure incurred on that account.25 [authors' italics] Indeed, the light dues in Hong Kong were more than adequate to cover lighthouses, and it was argued that the surplus should be employed to cross-subsidise other port facilities:
9. It will be observed that petitioners admit that shipping should pay for the lighthouses which are established and maintained for its benefit. If this principle be extended there appears to be no reason why shipping should not contribute towards other services which are maintained either directly or indirectly on its account such as the Harbour Department, Water Police, etc., the cost of which exceeds the amount raised from the dues of 2 V2 cents a ton imposed on shipping, [authors' italics] ficient for maintaining lighthouses.27 The fact was that at least during one moment in time, we had another example, outside England, where lighthouses were adequately financed by user charges. That the provider might 'overcharge' them by taking away some consumer surplus as per the model shown in Figure 2b of Part I of this article (Lai et al., 2008 ) is a separate issue.
27 It is likely that it did since, by the 1980s, almost every headland, pass, isolated rock or reef and small pier throughout the territory had been equipped with a light: in total, some 115 in 2007. Whilst, with the withdrawal of the last keepers in the late 1990s, all of these lights were unmanned and most were solar-powered, they all still had to be maintained.
In this context, Gap Rock Light was particularly enigmatic, as it was a positive externality because its construction and operation were funded by the commercial users of Hong Kong's port not only for their own benefit, but also for that of northward-bound navigators. There was an element of compulsion in the genesis not on the user, but on the provider. The colonial government did not want to honour its promise to lower its dues upon its completion. However, it had to cut light dues back to i cent due to objections from London. Also, there was no legal exclusion of private lighthouses. Ships that passed Hong Kong on their way to Shanghai and beyond could free-ride on this lighthouse. However, from a global point of view, the windfall gains by Tree riders' could theoretically be captured by 'ship dues' in other ports along the coast of China, which were payable to IMCS. The Hong Kong model indeed also shed light on the argument of 'free enterprise' advanced by Barnett II and Block, as the ships had many choices, including possibly the evasion of lighthouse charges, for example if they called at no point in China, but were headed for Korea or Japan.28
From various Reports of the Harbour Master, Hong Kong Government, we can detect a percentage of ships that did not report to lighthouses in Hong Kong or on Gap Rock before 1924, 1925 and 1928, respectively. The official explanation was that there were some 'telegraphic problems', but in reality it might well be that some problems were economic (like dues evasion) rather than technical. Indeed, lighthouses were often in key strategic positions. The Guia Light in Macau is located inside a fort, and there were stories of lighthouses in China attacked by pirates (Wallace, 2004) . Lighthouses in Colonial Hong Kong were manned by non-Chinese until 1956 (Ha and Waters, 2001) ,29 and there were military quarters30 and a Royal Navy radar station3' on Waglan Island. There were air raid shelters on both Gap Rock and Waglan. During the Second World War, both were bombed.32
Thus, the findings of our survey of the lighthouses in Imperial China and Colonial
Hong Kong corroborate those of Coase about lights in England: they were funded by user charges or indirect taxation with an element of price discrimination. The terminology 'ship dues', 'light dues', or 'harbour dues' did not really matter insofar as 28 In fact, this would have been an extremely unlikely eventuality given the patterns of late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century shipping trade, but that it did not actually happen does not obviate the argument that it could have done so.
29 All recruitment notices for lighthouse staff were in English, although maintenance tenders were in both Chinese and English. However, the historicity of this as a general statement needs further research. The Harbour Master's report on January 1913 by Commander Basil Taylor mentioned, at para. 27, p. D-20, problems due to 'the inexperience on the part of the Chinese lightkeepers' for the newly built 'Kap Sing Light'.
30 Ha and Waters (2001 , 296 297) .
31 'About Waglan Lighthouse' is an unpublished manuscript by an anonymous retired Marine Department employee supplied to the first author by the Marine Department. The biography of Ha and Waters (2001, 312) states that the author was Mr H.C Ixe.
32 Ha and Waters (2001, 296 
Discussion
Good empirical examples of public goods are lamentably rare. Coase's example of the lighthouse is a case in point. Critics made some interesting observations about the lighthouse market described by Coase (one important question was whether the market is really free), but they should not have assumed that Coase erred in his analysis. Critics complained that Coase found a real-world example of private lighthouses that were regulated, less than efficient, and far from being free enterprises. In so doing, critics ignored what Coase intended narrowly to achieve with his 1974 paper, and criticised not the inner logic of Coase's paper, but his brand of economics as it applied to their own preferences.
One curious point about the attack on and support for Coase's lighthouse example is that no detail of the actual relationship between a ship and a lighthouse, or of the tolls of lighthouses within and without England, has ever been addressed. This article has offered information on lighthouse supply, which takes into account the technology of navigation, pricing methods (levying light dues on the basis of tonnage, thus price discrimination) and growth in maritime trade. Further evidence in support of Coase's criticism of Samuelson's proposition that the lighthouse had to be funded exclusively from direct taxation or general revenue is provided by reference to the light dues levied on shipping entering Hong Kong.
Another critical point about Coase's paper is not its purpose and inner logic, but a question he did not ask: why was there a change in the institutional arrangements in lighthouse provision in England? This question should also be raised for examples of user-pays lighthouses elsewhere in the world. While this question is beyond the scope of Coase and this article, it remains a first-order question for any inquiry into a possible public good. Historical research is indispensable for answering this question. The hints offered by this article are that the impact of technology could be decisive, although in the Hong Kong case it was not, for converting a private good into a genuinely public one. A possible additional clue may be provided by the fact that, in an era when the strategy of seapower was of growing and eventually supreme importance in political and military thinking, military vessels of all nations were exempt from paying light dues. In that sense, of course, the free riders were the public authori- At Cordouan, in Bordeaux, France, there has stood a beacon since AD 880. A 48-foot lighthouse structure was built there when it was an English province under King Edward's son the Black Prince, and was manned by a hermit. Each passing boat was charged two groats (a kind of silver coin) (Hart-Davis and Troscianko, 2002, 10 1).
In 1695, having lost several ships on the Eddystone Rock 14 miles south of Plymouth, Henry Winstanley obtained leave from the Trinity House to build a lighthouse, which took four years. His permission was to charge dues of one penny per ton outward bound and one penny per ton inward bound, excepting coasters, to pay I2d for each passing (Hart-Davis and Troscianko, 2002, 119) . In colonial Hong Kong, an increased lighthouse duty of 2.5 cents per ton was imposed in 1890 on European ships that entered Victoria Harbour for the benefit of not only these ships using the Gap Rock Light, but also for coasters that went to Macau, Canton, Swatow, Amoy, Hangchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai instead of calling at Hong Kong. This form of light dues survived Hong Kong's handover to China. Its present rate (for a bundled port facilities and light dues) is 54 cents (HK$o.54) per 100 net ton of a vessel not classified as river trade or fishing vessel. Paul Samuelson's economics text, however, has not been revised to accept that the lighthouse is a good that can be funded by a toll.
However, participants in the debate over Coase's lighthouse have ignored the point that Coase's English case study has achieved less a novel theoretical criticism of Samuelson's 'arm chair' textbook example than a twentieth-century demonstration of a nineteenth-century French theoretical solution to the imagined trouble for a zero marginal cost public work. This solution is price discrimination. The French example used was not maritime but riparian: it was the bridge. Samuelson's mistake was not that he recalled Mill (1965 ), Sidgwick (1901 and Pigou (1932) , but that he did not read Dupuit, whose 1844 work became available in English as early as 1952.34 On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while Coase (1946) pointed out that 'multi-part pricing', citing Dupuit's work of 1844 Dupuit's work of (1952 , is a way to overcome the problem of marginal pricing for a falling average cost public utility, he did not discuss the merit of light dues based on tonnage as a kind of zero marginal cost-relevant solution.
A planner's epilogue
Other than putting Coase's less than accurate historical inquiry into proper context, how does our discussion on the lighthouse illuminate the road to planning for the provision of public goods for the common good? The answer is that the Gap Rock Light example offers another slant on the fallacy of analysing the problem of public goods using a simple private enterprise/public sector dichotomy. That the provision of a lighthouse in Chinese waters by Hong Kong was not initiated by the state but private 34 A11 instance of a textbook reference to Dupuit can be found in Koplin (1971, 169). enterprises, who were willing to be taxed more heavily (at least initially) for something that might benefit not just themselves but 'free-riders', is particularly instructive. This historical fact challenges 'received views' in either the libertarian-Coasian and interventionist-Pigovian camp. Issues of inefficiency due to zero marginal cost pricing did not arise; as elsewhere, there was price discrimination. Issues of non-rival consumption and free-riding were overcome by voluntary taxation. The colonial Hong Kong story calls for a non-static view of the provision of public goods (or, more precisely, Category 1 goods; see Lai et al., 2008, 404) by government.
For planning researchers won over by the concept of 'shirking', this case study may be highly provoking. The problem of 'shirking' by any member of a team can be seen as free-riding and hence as analogous to, if not an example of, a public good contractual issue. The 'shirking' problem is usually contained by some monitoring process inherent in the team's psycho-social dynamic. This accepts the obvious fact that no human being has an iron will. But the truth of that observation should point to the source of the 'shirking' problem as lying outside teamwork.
The psycho-social source is applicable to any individual seeking to counter a personal tendency to take the easy route. That is why movie stars hire personal coaches to help them do enough exercise. In short, 'shirking' is not essentially only a team problem.
It follows that because 'shirking' is an endemic and well-understood human inclination, team members, like individuals, may voluntarily hire outsiders to ensure full team contribution to the joint effort. To make fun of the principal-agent theorists who always find instances of 'shirking' in team work, economist Steven Cheung was fond of referring to the example of barge pullers in China hiring people to whip them so that they worked hard enough to drag the barge up stream. The enforcer was actually the agent, while the persons who were apparently being slave-driven or 'monitored' were in fact the principal.
The promotion of the construction and financing of the Gap Rock Light by Hong Kong shipping interests is therefore a case in point. In effect, these interests were aware that whatever their needs for a light on Gap Rock, political considerations and the actual foci of their daily business made a collective or individual effort to build one unlikely. There was thus a real public good problem calling for government involvement. They therefore followed the example of the barge pullers and got the government to build the light and exact light dues from them for the funding of this public facility. In fact as we noted above (Taylor, 2001 ), a similar route had been pioneered in England, when 60 years previously ship owners had forced the British Parliament to transform Trinity House into a monopoly to replace the existing competitive lighthouse market, and thereafter for it to levy light dues on them.
This example of private parties demanding and paying for the production of a public good by the state for public use must accordingly not be seen from the stance of the private-public dichotomy. That dichotomy too greatly simplifies reality as either a matter of private enterprise seeking to free itself from the bondage of the state, or one of public intervention crowding out private entrepreneurship. Gap Rock is instead a typical instantiation of how real life goes on, whether war and peace, colonisation and independence, or any other example, where 'the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all',35 and is best summarised by the term 'political economy'.
35 Ecclesiastes, 9:11.
